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E. M. Dadlez and Jeanette Bicknell
NoT MoDEraTELy MoraL:  
WHy HUME Is NoT a “MoDEraTE MoraLIsT”
Abstract. In the debates over the moral content of artworks, the group 
whose views are known variously as “ethicism,” “moralism,” or “moderate 
moralism” has claimed Hume as one of its own, and this supposed kin-
ship has gone largely uncontested. We argue, contra Gaut and others, 
that the “merited response argument” is not to be found in Hume, and 
that he was not a (moderate) moralist in the current sense. Hume did 
indeed hold that our moral responses contribute to aesthetic assessment, 
but this does not amount to the claim that moral laws in works of art 
are also aesthetic laws.
If philosophers held popularity contests, David Hume would be a perennial winner. Witty, a bon vivant, and champion of reason over 
bigotry and superstition, it is not surprising that many contemporary 
thinkers want to recruit him as an ally or claim his views as precursors 
to their own. In the debate over the moral content of artworks and its 
possible relevance for artistic and aesthetic value, the group whose views 
are known variously as “ethicism,” “moralism,” or “moderate moralism” 
has claimed Hume as one of its own.1 
Very briely, “moderate moralism” is the view that sometimes the 
moral content of artworks must be taken into account when assess-
ing artistic or aesthetic value. The moralists’ presumed kinship with 
Hume has gone largely uncontested, even by those defending other 
positions in the debate.2 But how much afinity is there between these 
contemporary views and those expressed by Hume? Despite the careful 
reasoning of those espousing the moderate moralist position, and for 
all its vaunted moderation, these views have not been able completely 
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to shake, at least in some quarters, association with well-intentioned 
censorship or even a distinctly un-Humean prissiness in regard to oth-
ers’ artistic tastes. In this paper, we will not enter the debate over the 
moral import of artworks, largely because we subscribe to opposing 
views. one of us is in many respects a moderate moralist, whereas one 
of us is not.3 But that puts us in a particularly good position to launch 
an objective assessment. and we agree that Hume was not a moderate 
moralist in the full sense of that designation, if it is taken to apply to 
the full range of views variously and recently espoused by Berys Gaut, 
Noël Carroll, and Matthew Kieran. 
Why is the moderate moralist so often tempted to claim an afiliation 
with Hume? Principally because of a key passage in Hume’s essay “of 
the standard of Taste,” in which he informs the reader that
where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, 
and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the 
proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to 
disigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper 
I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, 
on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition. 
The want of humanity and of decency, so conspicuous in the characters 
drawn by several of the ancient poets… diminishes considerably the merit 
of their noble performances…. We are not interested in the fortunes and 
sentiments of such rough heroes: We are displeased to ind the limits of 
vice and virtue so much confounded: and whatever indulgence we may give 
to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves 
to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we 
plainly discover to be blameable…. a very violent effort is requisite to 
change our judgment of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation 
or blame, love or hatred, different from those to which the mind from 
long custom has been familiarized. and where a man is conident of the 
rectitude of that moral standard, by which he judges, he is justly jealous 
of it, and will not pervert the sentiments of his heart for a moment, in 
complaisance to any writer whatsoever. (sT, pp. 246–47)
Moral laws are clearly linked to aesthetic ones in this passage. art is 
apparently disigured by endorsing immoral positions, though this 
disigurement appears to consist in the inability of readers to enter 
into the attitude of approbation that the work invites them to adopt 
by issuing the endorsement that it does. Twice, Hume speaks of our 
inability to enter into the sentiments the work is intended to elicit. We 
will argue, then, that Hume’s point is more psychological than ethical. 
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It offers clariication not about what makes works ethical but about what 
makes works (ethically and otherwise) accessible. This latter point is 
directly relevant to their aesthetic success or failure. Inaccessibility—or 
a failure to engage the appreciator emotionally and imaginatively—is 
the aesthetic law for Hume, rather than immorality. The problem is 
a general failure of uptake for which the work rather than the appre-
ciator is responsible. We will concede that Hume believed our moral 
(for Hume, sentimental) responses to a work contribute to its aesthetic 
assessment, and that to this extent he agrees with moderate moralists. 
But we will maintain at the same time that this does not amount to 
Hume’s holding that ethical laws (such as a work’s endorsement of 
immoral attitudes) are aesthetic laws.
Let us consider in greater depth what a position like moderate mor-
alism involves. Moralists situate themselves somewhere between the 
extremes of aestheticism or autonomism on the one hand, and immor-
alism on the other. The former is the view that it is never appropriate 
to bring moral considerations to bear when assessing art. oscar Wilde, 
Clive Bell, and Monroe Beardsley have held forth on variations of this 
theme. Immoralism, on the other hand, is the view that an artwork’s 
immoral content might make it a better work of art.4 according to a 
recent survey of views on morality and artistic value, moralists hold that, 
“where the moral character of a work is relevant to its artistic value, 
wherever there is a moral law the work is of lesser value as art and 
wherever it is morally virtuous the work’s value as art is enhanced.”5 
Moralists have a number of strategies to support their views. They point 
to moral criticism both throughout the history of art evaluation and 
in everyday nonspecialist discourse about art. They sometimes invoke 
a cognitive account of artistic value, whereby art can be valued for the 
way it contributes to understanding, including moral understanding.
Contemporary moralists also appeal to the “merited response argu-
ment.” It goes like this: Works of art prescribe certain responses on 
the part of suitably informed audiences. Comedies prescribe laughter; 
ghost stories prescribe fear. yet these prescribed responses are not always 
merited. The comedy may not be funny; the ghost story may not be 
frightening. The horror ilm may not, in fact, horrify. In cases where 
the prescribed response concerns moral activity, whether the response 
is merited or not will also depend upon moral considerations. so, of 
course, one way in which a response of approval might not be merited 
would involve whether an audience considers it ethically inappropriate 
to imagine the event or action depicted in the work approvingly. It is 
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simply wrong, for example, to have an erotic response to sexual torture. 
Hence the sadism manifested in the writings of de sade constitutes an 
ethical and thereby an aesthetic failing.6 We will return later to the mer-
ited response argument, as it is sometimes said to be found in Hume.
Hume’s writings on art and morality are limited to the few paragraphs 
at the end of his essay “of the standard of Taste,” the relevant parts of 
which were cited at the outset of this paper. Before turning to Hume’s 
brief remarks, however, we need to put them in the context of the 
essay as a whole. Hume considers the problem that, on the one hand, 
taste is held to be individual and subjective. on the other hand, there 
are canons of art, and we have little trouble recognizing those with 
inferior taste. When someone esteems ogilby over Milton or Bunyan 
over addison (not to say Dan Brown over Dostoevsky or Kenny G over 
John Coltrane), “we pronounce, without scruple, the sentiment of these 
pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous,” as Hume puts it. His 
“solution” to this dilemma is that the standard of taste is to be found 
in the joint verdict of ideal critics or true judges. as he so often does 
elsewhere in his philosophy, Hume provides a social or psychological 
answer to what has been taken to be a metaphysical problem. The larger 
part of Hume’s essay describes and discusses the qualities of ideal critics. 
These rare individuals have “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, 
improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all 
prejudice” (sT, p. 241). In the last few paragraphs of the essay, Hume 
offers two reasons why ideal critics might disagree. The irst is that they 
may have “blameless differences in taste.” one likes still-life paintings, 
and another prefers landscapes. one likes string quartets, and another 
prefers large-scale symphonic works (sT, p. 244).
The second reason why true judges might disagree is at the heart of 
the moderate moralist reading of Hume. It is worth working through 
slowly. Even true judges might fail to appreciate a work from an earlier 
age or a different culture if it is premised on “ideas of morality and 
decency” that differ signiicantly from their own (sT, p. 246). Judges 
ought to make allowances for the continual revolution of manners and 
customs, though these can often hamper genuine appreciation. To be 
“shocked” by “innocent peculiarities of manners” is to stand convicted of 
“false delicacy” (sT, pp. 245–46). But genuine and deep moral differences 
between ideal critics and writers or artists are much more problematic. 
These differences are associated in some way with a disigurement or 
deformity in the work, rather than a defect in critical apprehension.
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so it seems, at least on the face of it, that a moral defect in an art-
work is also an artistic defect. But notice that Hume does not make the 
general claim that any moral defect is an artistic defect, or even that any 
“aesthetically relevant” moral defect is also an artistic defect, a modiied 
and more defensible position taken up by some moderate moralists. 
He speaks, rather, of “vicious manners,” such as those that manifest a 
“want of humanity and of decency,” and that are depicted without dis-
approbation in the ancient poets, up to and including Homer. Indeed, 
such blameworthy behavior is sometimes even depicted as laudable and 
heroic and magniicent—written of as if it were admirable rather than 
despicable. Hume relects on the kind of emotional and imaginative 
resistance that we can experience in response to works such as these. 
We cannot feel approval and admiration toward acts we ind contempt-
ible. We cannot “enter into such sentiments” or identify with characters 
whose values differ so radically from our own. Thus our overall pleasure 
in the work is correspondingly diminished.
Here, we take Hume to be making two claims. Most of what Hume can 
be taken to maintain in this passage involves a psychological point about 
the limitations of critics, even ideal critics. The growing literature on the 
so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance7 is rooted in this passage. Even 
ideal critics, with their considerable sensitivity and experience, who are 
able in most cases to set prejudices aside, cannot set aside certain deeply 
held moral convictions and appreciate art that violates them in serious 
ways. This “limitation” that ideal critics are said to suffer might be a 
natural cognitive restriction or might simply be a pragmatic limitation. 
In either case, a failure of uptake inhibits full appreciation of the work. 
It prevents the audience, in other words, from having the very reaction 
that the work (or, more properly, its author) endeavors to arouse. That 
suggests a failure in the work. It seems clear that Hume does not regard 
this particular inhibition as a failure, because of appreciator ineptitude, 
narrow-mindedness, or insularity. There is a mistake of sorts, certainly, 
but it is to be found in the work’s failure to engage us.
Does this add up to something like the merited response argument? 
Not to the extent that some moderate moralists claim, for the follow-
ing reasons. For one thing, Hume does not seem to share the general 
account of artworks prescribing certain responses in audiences as a 
whole; a work’s artistic value hangs on the response of ideal critics or 
true judges. We take this to be one of the points of the story of the 
wine tasters, derived from Don Quixote: the true judges have powers 
of discernment and judgment that are not necessarily shared by the 
population at large, or not shared in their entirety, or not possessed to 
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the same degree. What if we modify the merited response argument 
to take into account the response of Humean true judges? This move 
will get us no farther. Hume’s main point is not that immoral works 
prescribe responses that they do not merit. rather, it is that we cannot 
even begin to respond to such works because we cannot engage with 
them. This is, irst, a point about our moral psychology, not the actual 
moral merit of the works. It is only about how artworks succeed or fail 
to the extent that they succeed or fail in engaging us. That is, it does 
not seem principally to be about how artworks can fail to get it right, 
morally speaking, and how that can make them bad artworks. It seems to 
be about how artworks are better if they engage us than if they do not.
Here is another way of looking at the issue that takes Hume’s psycho-
logical approach more to heart. Works do not prescribe fear or amusement 
or moral approval to readers or audiences. rather, within their ictional 
worlds, this or that situation or action is dangerous or funny or morally 
praiseworthy. and (here is where imaginative resistance comes in) it may 
be the case that we cannot imagine the danger of some situation that 
we have always regarded as safe, or the humor of some state of affairs 
we have always regarded as pathetic, or the moral praiseworthiness of 
an action we have always regarded as cruel. Fictions can change our 
minds about what counts as dangerous or funny or morally laudable, 
of course. But when they do not, and we run into a brick wall, imagi-
natively speaking, it appears to be because we cannot imagine what we 
cannot conceive. 
Put another way, we may have extreme dificulty imagining someone’s 
conduct as dashing or romantic when the text in question describes 
that conduct as having properties we believe are suficient for wholesale 
repulsiveness. We may ind the leap dificult even when the narrative 
endorses that behavior by describing it as romantic, while at the same 
time offering particulars entirely at odds with any such description. It may 
likewise prove virtually impossible to imagine a situation fearfully when 
a narrative describes that situation as instantiating properties that one 
believes are suficient for perfect safety. What we can imagine depends 
to some extent on our epistemic commitments. Imaginative resistance 
or imaginative disengagement may well be indicators of an inadequate 
ictional rationale for sharing a work’s endorsement.8 as Hume puts it, 
sometimes we “cannot enter into such sentiments” (sT, p. 246). and 
that may just be a story about how our existing conceptual and epistemic 
commitments can underwrite our emotional and imaginative responses. 
To say that we sometimes experience imaginative incapacity rather 
than mere resistance is not to claim that this is always or even often 
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the case. We are all occasionally masters at not attending to things that 
might disturb us and spoil our enjoyment. We frequently ignore por-
tions of a storyline, or provide imaginative amendments and excuses and 
justiications, that permit us to continue our imaginative engagement 
unhampered by sticky or distracting moral questions. But to say this 
still allows that there are occasions when we will simply not be able to 
imagine that an act depicted in a iction is morally laudable, even when 
an omniscient narrator tells us so in no uncertain terms. We concede, 
in fact, that one sometimes has to turn over rocks to ind absolutely 
unmistakable examples of imaginative disruption in moral contexts. 
andrew Macdonald’s sequel to The Turner Diaries, called Hunter, scuttles 
out from under just such a rock, however. It gives us a glimpse not only 
of morally repulsive content but of a morally repulsive perspective on 
that content, and an endorsement of that perspective as true. This work 
tells us that its hero “oscar yeager... inds that... he is compelled to ight 
the evil which aflicts america in the 1990s; his conscience will not let 
him ignore it.”9 In the world of Hunter, yeager is a courageous man of 
conscience who battles evil. He does so by gunning down unarmed 
interracial couples in supermarket parking lots after dark. The work is 
replete with endorsements of this conduct—with characterizations of it 
as right and laudable and brave. But clearly, the conduct so endorsed 
instantiates characteristics that most regard as deplorable, not laudable. 
our conception of what constitutes a laudable act is at odds with the 
presentation of yeager’s killing of unarmed civilians because of their 
race as praiseworthy and courageous. and we are certainly inclined 
to think that we are justiied in calling a work like Hunter immoral on 
such grounds. 
The point is that we cannot approve of or admire such rough heroes, 
even though some white supremacists can, just as Hume says we cannot 
approve of Homer’s less offensively rough heroes, even though Homer’s 
contemporaries could. “Whatever indulgence we may give to the writer 
on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter 
into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly 
discover to be blameable” (sT, p. 246). This is probably an occasional 
psychological fact about our reactions to iction. But having said that, 
it still seems clear that there is a way in which such facts about a colli-
sion between our ethical conceptions and those endorsed in a work of 
iction can affect the assessment of a work. In such cases, a work does 
not produce the emotional responses that it is intended by its creator 
to elicit, as Hume makes very clear in the passage we have cited. Now, 
that does not have to mean that our assessment of whether the work has 
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it “right,” morally speaking, factors directly into aesthetic assessment. 
But it does tell us when a work cannot fully engage the sentiments and 
imagination of Hume’s audience of ideal critics. recollect that engaging 
the sentiments and imagination is a crucial function of literature, the 
breakdown of which would clearly signal an aesthetic law.
obviously, Hume does not expect all people in a given era to have 
the same imaginative and moral/emotional reaction to the same work. 
But sociopaths who imaginatively embrace the moral endorsements 
to be found in Hunter, for instance, wouldn’t begin to meet Hume’s 
requirements for the ideal critic. Hume says that a genuinely reined 
taste is that which, alike, “enables us to judge of the characters of men, 
of compositions of genius, and of the productions of the nobler arts”10 
(DTP, p. 6). He also believes that delicacy of taste is favorable to love 
and friendship, for it confers the ability, sometimes inaccessible to sense 
alone, to distinguish among characters and to mark “those insensible 
differences and gradations which make one man preferable to another” 
(DTP, p. 7). We use the same faculties to understand and appreciate art 
that we use in life, and Hume clearly takes this to include our moral lives. 
Hume’s ideal critics would, given the portability of their capacity for 
insight and their ability to make ine and astute discriminations, be 
more likely than an average person (and certainly more likely than a 
white supremacist) to imaginatively disengage from works that get the 
ethical part of the equation profoundly wrong. Now, if the ideal critic’s 
response is to be confounded by the work and unable to appreciate it, 
that means, surely, that the work has failed—failed to elicit the response 
its creator aspired to produce and therefore failed aesthetically, as Carroll 
has suggested.11 But to say this is not necessarily to concede that Hume 
would support a prescriptivist story about why that is the case. 
Hume’s account has not yet been shown to be a full-blown moderate 
moralism of the prescriptivist lavor. Consider, for instance, that Gaut12 
interprets Hume’s normative claim—the “nor is it proper that I should” 
claim—as follows: “That ought to be the core claim: the responses must 
be merited, not simply the ones we actually have.”13 However, it is not our 
moral assessment of the work, nor is it our having the right reasons for 
responding as we do, that contributes directly to the aesthetic assessment 
in Hume. What igures negatively in aesthetic evaluation is our inability 
to enter imaginatively into the perspective the work invites us to adopt. 
Moderate moralists will hasten to point out that this is the perspective the 
work prescribes. That is correct as far as it goes, and to that extent Hume 
has something in common with the moderate moralist. The difference 
is that Hume does not bring consideration of whether that prescription 
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is merited (whether the author gets it right, morally speaking) to bear 
in any direct way on the judgment of whether the work is good or not. 
all that is brought to bear on that judgment is the question of whether 
the work successfully engages its audience.
Let us return briely to the parallel between a work’s failure to elicit 
fear and a work’s failure to elicit approval. For a prescribed fear (on 
behalf of the heroine of a novel, say) to be merited, the depicted cir-
cumstances would have to be dangerous. They would not just have to 
be believed by the reader to be dangerous (and we can imagine all 
kinds of mismatches between the belief and the actuality, as when an 
individual believes some disorder to be infectious when it is not). The 
heroine’s depicted situation would have to consist of things that would 
be genuine threats if they were real. Thus, merited response in the 
context of prescribed fear operates in terms of a kind of conceptually 
motivated fact check. Threat to life and limb? Check. Threat to emo-
tional well-being? Check. Perils galore? Check. That is, everything turns 
on whether the things depicted as being dangers are actually danger-
ous. The author has committed an egregious offense against art if he 
gets what can count as dangerous wrong (e.g., luffy bunnies—except 
in Monty Python movies). 
Notice that this is a question about concepts and categories and the 
appropriateness of property ascription. It is a question about a kind 
of technical mistake that authors can make. That is, if an author has 
described a situation suficient in every respect for perfect safety but 
nonetheless endorses the view of it as dangerous (by reporting the 
heroine’s trepidation upon seeing bunnies, in the complete absence of 
any plot elements involving such things as plague-carrying rabbits), then 
that author has erred. and the question of whether this particular kind 
of error has occurred is radically distinct from a question concerning 
the kind of sentimental engagement Hume is talking about. a techni-
cal mistake about what kinds of situations can count as dangerous or 
what kinds of actions can count as right (for a person up to speed on 
different varieties of peril, great and small, or for a virtuous person) will 
undoubtedly factor into a causal explanation of someone’s imaginative 
disengagement from a work, but that doesn’t make that imaginative 
disengagement the same as the thing that caused it. 
a relation of identity is quite distinct from that which obtains between 
cause and effect. It is obvious that Hume is principally interested in the 
question of our imaginative and emotional engagement when it comes 
to considering one kind of aesthetic law a work can have. This is what 
ultimately distinguishes him from the kind of moderate moralist we 
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have been discussing. For Hume an ethical law, such as the endorse-
ment of a racist worldview, wouldn’t be the same as an aesthetic one, 
such as a consequent failure on the part of an ideal judge to engage 
with the work. For a moderate moralist the ethical law is an aesthetic 
law, because it is a technical mistake about what can count as moral.
Let us return to the key passage in Hume for a little further evidence. 
His irst, psychological, claim about the way that most people, or at least 
ideal critics, will respond to artworks that have gross moral defects may 
be true or false. To know for sure we would have to test it. His second 
claim in the passage is normative: It would not be “proper” for ideal 
critics to set aside their own moral convictions in order to appreciate 
works that embody an alien moral perspective. Even if ideal critics could 
set aside prejudice in this case, they should refrain from doing so. This 
is a point about how to engage with art. again, it does not propose a 
basis for artistic evaluation. It would seem that the “merited response 
argument” in its most general form is not to be found in Hume. We 
will offer some additional reasons for assuming that Hume does not 
subscribe to the prescriptivist story in its entirety.
one consideration involves several references that Hume makes to 
a work’s inability to engage audiences in successive eras, as manners 
and customs and moral standards undergo changes. Hume draws our 
attention to precisely such works in the passage that has been under 
scrutiny, when he speaks of our inability to engage with Homer’s rough 
heroes. Elsewhere in the same essay, he relects on the way in which 
works of literature can sometimes stand the test of time, engaging gen-
eration after generation in a way that neither philosophy nor science 
can hope to emulate: “Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, 
after a little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain for ever. 
arIsToTLE, and PLaTo, and EPICUrUs, and DEsCarTEs, may 
successively yield to each other: But TErENCE and VIrGIL maintain 
an universal, undisputed empire over the minds of men. The abstract 
philosophy of CICEro has lost its credit: The vehemence of his oratory 
is still the object of our admiration” (sT, p. 242). 
Consider the kind of literary work that cannot even survive its own 
decade, or that survives that decade only to give rise to general imagina-
tive and sentimental disengagement. This tells us exactly when a work 
has not stood the test of time. and a work’s capacity to stand the test 
of time is clearly one way to identify that work’s aesthetic superiority, 
according to Hume. again, this is more a matter of imaginative and 
emotional accessibility than it is of speciic features that will make the 
work accessible.
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Hume wrote in a time when no one seriously doubted that moral consid-
erations were relevant for understanding and assessing art. aestheticism 
and autonomism would not be formulated as positions about art for 
over one hundred years. Hence Hume does not have to craft his posi-
tion within the context of competing and contrasting views about the 
role of morality in art criticism. (and even a cursory reading of Hume 
alerts one to his practice of setting up and expounding the details of 
contrasting views, where they are to be found.) The situation for con-
temporary thinkers is different: a variety of well-argued positions are 
on offer, some of which Hume might never have dreamt. There is also 
a drive for generality and precision about these questions that seems 
alien to early modern thinkers. The fact that Hume thought that moral 
considerations were relevant in understanding and assessing art is not 
enough to make him a moralist in the contemporary sense. If it were, 
then anyone from Plotinus through schiller could be claimed as a pre-
cursor of today’s moderate moralism.
Hints indicate that Hume’s considered views about art and moral-
ity may have been more accommodating than the “moralist” reading 
of him suggests. For one thing, he does not mention any distinctively 
moral qualiications for true judges. When Hume discusses the overlap 
between artistic and moral judgment, as in the essay “of the Delicacy 
of Taste and Passion,” the causality seems to run in the opposite direc-
tion. Delicate passions for art and beauty help us to assess situations 
and character, but Hume does not emphasize the reverse—that moral 
acumen would help us assess art. If Hume was convinced that a work’s 
moral value was just one of those properties (like rhetorical brilliance) 
which, taken together, constituted its artistic value, it seems reasonable 
to assume that he would have stressed the capacity to discern that par-
ticular property in his description of true judges.
Furthermore, in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume 
evinces some impatience with the “perpetual cant of the stoics and Cynics 
concerning virtue.”14 Then there is his somewhat gratuitous putdown 
of John Bunyan, the Christian allegorist. and remember that, in “of 
the standard of Taste,” his irst remarks about morality and art are to 
warn readers against “false delicacy” and to caution us not to confuse 
differences in customs and manners with real substantive moral disagree-
ments. Hume never makes a general argument about any and all moral 
laws that might be found in an artwork. Nor does he limit himself, as 
contemporary moralists do, to discussing artistically or aesthetically “rel-
evant” laws. Indeed, it should be emphasized that Hume’s remarks are 
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purely negative. Very tellingly, he says nothing about the superiority of 
artworks that convey a positive moral message and how the true judge 
might respond to them. He does not argue, as do at least a few con-
temporary moralists, that some morally worthy artworks have enhanced 
artistic or aesthetic value, in virtue of their being morally worthy. We 
look to his work in vain for praise of moral uplift, even though such 
praise was common in the work of close contemporaries. For instance, 
Kames, in his Elements of Criticism, is transixed by the (literally, accord-
ing to him) providential capacity of literature to “improve us in virtue,” 
and to regulate our conduct in a manner that is happily both painless 
and entertaining.15 We see precious little of that in Hume.
We want to say, then, that the kind of imaginative resistance or 
incapacity with which Hume believes we are sometimes aflicted—on 
account of ictions which endorse perspectives that confound our moral 
intuitions—can (though it will not always) signal a failure to stand the 
test of time or a failure to produce a response the author aspired to 
evoke. These are clear aesthetic failures. so we believe Hume held that 
our moral responses do contribute to aesthetic assessment. But we do 
not think this amounts to claiming that moral laws in works of art are 
aesthetic laws.
Debates over the moral qualities of artworks, and about what rel-
evance this has for artistic or aesthetic value, are likely to continue for 
some time. There is an understandable tendency to interpret thinkers 
of the past in light of our own concerns, preoccupations, and concep-
tual frameworks. But we must be careful that, in our attempts to make 
philosophers of the past current and pertinent, we do not at the same 
time foist upon them views not congruent with their work.
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